COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT HAS CHANGED.

From a Western vantage point, multilateralism remains the stated ideal. Global problems require global solutions. Interdependence lowers costs. Institutions create predictability. The European Union embodies that logic.

But that model assumes shared restraint and burden-sharing. That assumption is weakening.

Multilateral institutions still matter. The IMF lends. The EU single market functions. NATO’s Article 5 still deters. But they no longer monopolise influence.

Increasingly, power is exercised through coalitions of the willing.

This is not a new phenomena. The war in Afghanistan operated as a variable coalition. The Proliferation Security Initiative sat outside treaty structures. AUKUS, the Quad and OPEC+ follow the same logic: actors with shared interests, political will and capability move ahead rather than waiting for universal consensus.

Those are the necessary ingredients - coalitions form when interests, will and capability align. And, when they do, decisions follow.

Why does this matter?

Because the rules of access, influence and risk are shifting. Many organisations are still allocating capital and structuring partnerships on assumptions shaped by a more predictable multilateral era.

Multilateral systems promise shared burden. In practice, incentives often push states to shift costs onto others unless enforcement is credible. Under intensified rivalry, free-riding hardens. The WTO’s dispute settlement paralysis and repeated UN Security Council deadlock reflect that reality. Semiconductor export controls and critical minerals access are now shaped less by global rulebooks than by coalitional alignment.

The result is not chaos. It is redistribution of influence across overlapping networks.

Coalitions are shaping markets. AUKUS is integrating defence industrial capacity. OPEC+ decisions move global energy prices. The Quad influences technology coordination. BRICS expansion reflects states seeking alternative platforms.

They move faster because they exclude.

Exclusion, however, produces fragmentation. Regulatory divergence widens. Competing standards emerge. Supply chains are redesigned for resilience as much as efficiency. Rival coalitions duplicate effort and increase systemic cost.

Power dynamics are more complex than “large powers win.” The United States and China operate comfortably through coalitional leverage. Middle powers have potential for outsized influence — as Mark Carney argued at Davos — but potential without coordination does not translate into power. At present, major powers are moving with greater coherence and speed.

The European Union illustrates the tension. It possesses economic weight and regulatory reach. Yet structural leverage does not automatically translate into strategic leadership. Internal divisions continue to constrain decisive action absent a major forcing event.

From parts of the Global South, this shift may look less like fragmentation and more like diversification — and, in some cases, strategic opportunity to manoeuvre between blocs.

We are not witnessing the collapse of order. We are witnessing its reconfiguration.

That reconfiguration creates tensions for leaders operating in the global arena:

•         Speed versus legitimacy

•         Alignment versus access

•         Resilience versus efficiency

•         Influence through institutions versus influence through networks

You cannot optimise for all of these simultaneously.

The greater risk is not geopolitical volatility itself. It is embedding outdated system assumptions into long-term strategic decisions.

The question is not whether you prefer the multilateral model. It is whether your strategy reflects the system that actually exists.

Best regards,

Xenia

Wickett Advisory

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